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The Big Carrot: High-Stakes Incentives Revisited 
 
      “If you erroneously believe in God, you lose nothing (assuming that death is the 
absolute end), whereas if you correctly believe in God, you gain everything (eternal 
bliss). But if you correctly disbelieve in God, you gain nothing (death ends all), whereas 
if you erroneously disbelieve in God, you lose everything (eternal damnation)”. 
 Pascal’s argument (extracted from "Pensées"). 
 
1 Motivation 
Recently, three salient topics have increased interest in the role of incentives in 
economic decisions: the loss aversion theory (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1991); the 
effectiveness of punishment (vs. rewards) in experimental settings (Andreoni, Harbaugh & 
Vesterlund, 2003; Nikiforakis, 2008); and how results may vary when incentives are 
substantially larger – high-stakes incentives (Slonim & Roth, 1998).  
Following Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) it is assumed that subjects invest in religious 
activities (church attendance and prayer) as necessary conditions for reaching heaven and 
avoiding hell. Heaven and hell therefore serve as incentives for religious behaviour. An 
interesting question that follows is whether religious activity of individuals is indeed 
affected by the degree of their belief in after-life. Moreover, is religious behaviour affected 
differently by belief in heaven (that relates to a gain/reward) and in hell (that expresses a 
loss/punishment)?    
This paper provides an empirical example of the effect of high-stakes incentives on 
religious practice, using about 35,000 personal observations. It shows that the positive 
(heaven=gain) and negative (hell=loss) after-life incentives significantly affect religious 
behaviour.  
However, the effectiveness of punishment, when rewards are also available, is small. 
Thus, our data support the linkage between incentives and performance but do not provide 
evidence in favour of the loss aversion theory that would suggest that the disutility of 
‘eternal damnation’ is larger than the utility of ‘eternal bliss’
3. 
                                                 
3 Given that ”death as the absolute end” is the baseline, then, “ stay in heaven=eternal bliss” is a “positive” 
deviation (representing a “gain”), while “stay in hell=eternal damnation ” is a “negative” deviation from the 
baseline (representing a “loss”). The standard loss aversion theory claims that the disutility of a loss is larger 
than the utility of a parallel gain, leading to an expected stronger effect of the belief in hell. Obviously, we are   3
The statistical approach is simple. Using the ISSP 1998: Religion II dataset, which 
focuses on religious individual behaviour, we estimate church-attendance equations and 
prayer equations (see for instance Brañas-Garza & Neuman, 2004). Church attendance and 
prayer are both measures of religious practice that, obviously, might be affected by 
incentives. 
In addition to a battery of childhood and socio-demographic explanatory variables (and 
controlling for country-specific variables), we introduced our two core variables: 
  i carrot =1  if the ith individual absolutely believes in heaven, and 
  i stick =1 if s/he absolutely believes in hell.  
Alternatively, in order to explore the effect of the lack of incentives, the estimation was 
repeated using dummies for those who do not believe at all in the existence of heaven 
(   i no carrot ) or in hell (   i no stick ). In a similar vein, the ‘reversed’ loss aversion hypothesis 
will also be that absolute disbelief in hell should have a stronger (negative) effect on 
religious performance compared to the absolute disbelief in heaven. 
It was found that the effect of the carrot (heaven) is more than three times as large as the 
effect of the stick (hell). Consistently, we also found that the (negative) effect of the lack of 
belief in the existence of heaven is triple the effect of the lack of belief in the existence of 
hell. To conclude, in the presence of the largest possible stakes (infinitum rewards or 
punishment)
4, rewards (carrots) are more effective than punishment (stick) in encouraging 
religious practice (for a review on carrot/stick incentives see Andreoni et al., 2003). 
 
2   Literature overview 
The determinants of religious behaviour and practice have been studied intensively 
within the various disciplines of the social sciences (in particular, within sociology, 
psychology, anthropology and economics). The literature considered both personal-level 
variables (education, age, gender, etc.) and state-level determinants (e.g., state diversity of 
                                                                                                                                                     
stretching here the loss aversion theory that refers to finite and immediate losses/gains. Within the 
‘concluding remarks’ in the last section, there is some reference to the questions of ‘size’ and ‘discounting’. 
4 Recall Pascal’s argument (extracted from "Pensées") cited above. He refers to infinite bliss and damnation. 
Interestingly, Pascal is using the same terms that modern economics uses, when he refers to ‘gains’ versus 
‘losses’. 
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religions, institutions, political organizations, and type of society/culture). There is a vast 
literature on this topic and its review is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a brief 
overview of closely related literature on theoretical and quantitative analyses of (i) religious 
practice; (ii) incentives; and (iii) punishment versus rewards, adds new perspectives and 
places our reported results within a scientific theoretical framework.   
2.1 Religious practice: Demand-side versus supply-side theories and evidence 
Two types of theories have been offered for the analysis of religious practice, demand-
side models versus supply-side models: (1) Demand-side models characterize many of the 
studies within the sociological/psychological disciplines. Demand-side theories are in line 
with the ‘secularization hypothesis’ that first appeared in Weber (1930), who credited the 
idea to Wesley’s writings in the late 1700's. This research area has a rich and well 
documented tradition that has manifested as an academic debate encompassing several 
decades of scholarly discourse and study. Numerous studies offer both supportive and 
contradictory evidence for the core principles of the secularization thesis
5. To mention just 
a few of these: Support for the secularization thesis can be found in Chaves (1994); 
Yamane (1997); and Sommerville (1998). The leading critics of the secularization theory 
include the Americans Greeley (1985); Finke (1992); Warner (1993); and Stark (1999). 
Swatos and Christiano (1999) provide a historical overview of the secularization thesis and 
debate; (2) Supply-side models (sometimes referred to as market models) are more common 
in the economic literature and are relatively new. The leading proponents of the Market 
Theory of religiosity are Iannaccone, Finke, and Stark (e.g. Iannaccone, 1991; Finke, 1992; 
Finke & Iannaccone, 1993; Stark, 1999, to mention very few among many others). Others 
argue that supply-side theories are problematic. Important counter arguments were made by 
Breault (1989a, 1989b), Olson (1999), and Chaves and Gorski (2001).  
                                                 
5 The concept ‘secularization’ has been used in the literature to refer to diverse aspects such as: (i) 
differentiation of society's major institutions (law, politics, economy, education, etc.) from religious 
influence; (ii) rationalization (Wilson, 1966; Martin, 1978); (iii) demystification of all spheres of life; (iv) less 
adherence to religious acts such as attendance of religious services and prayer. Here, we only refer to this last 
aspect of secularization. Sommerville (1998) sorted out the different aspects of secularization and divided 
them into two categories: (i) those presented in terms of processes (like decline, differentiation, 
disengagement, rationalization); or (ii) in terms of aspects of life or levels of analyses (structural, cultural, 
organizational, individual). We refer to ‘secularization’ as a decline in individual religious practice. 
Tschannen (1991) provides an inventory of the elements of classic theories of secularization. 
   5
In most cases, the two distinctive types of models lead to different and sometimes 
opposing conclusions/hypotheses. Survey data can be used for the statistical testing of the 
various hypotheses, lending support to one model against the other. Two examples will be 
used to illustrate the difference between the supply-side versus demand-side theories:  
(i)What is the relationship between state religious pluralism and secularization? The 
‘supply-side’ or ‘market’ theory predicts less secularization (more religious adherence) in 
countries which are more religiously-diverse; and at the other end, the ‘demand-side’ 
theory expects more secularization in more religiously pluralistic states.  
The supply-side approach treats churches as firms producing a mix of valuable products 
in a ‘religious market’ (e.g. Ekelund, Herbert & Tollison, 1989; Thronton, 1992; and 
Iannaccone, 1991). If religious markets function like other markets, then a greater diversity 
of religions available in a country is said to promote greater competition, and hence, a 
religion product of higher quality. Religiously pluralistic markets would stimulate churches 
to produce religious services well adapted to the needs of religious consumers, thereby 
increasing ‘religious consumption’ (e.g. church attendance) (examples of such studies 
include Iannaccone, 1992, 1995; Finke & Stark 1988, 1992; Finke & Iannaccone, 1993; and 
Stark & Iannaccone, 1994). An often cited example for the positive relationship between 
pluralism and religiosity is the United States, which among the industrialized nations, has 
both the highest levels of religious pluralism and one of the highest rates of church 
attendance (e.g. Warner, 1993; although Hout & Fischer, 2002, reported opposed facts). 
Thus, more religious diversity stimulates greater religious participation (less 
secularization). 
The efficiency of religion providers is furthermore decreased if there is a state-religion 
and greater state-regulation of religion – measured, for instance, by whether the 
government appoints or approves church leaders (Chaves & Cann, 1992). The supply-side 
theory would therefore expect more secularization in countries with state-religion and state-
regulation of religion. An often cited example in this context is Sweden that had a state-
religion (until the year 2000) and also exhibited high rates of secularization, mainly among 
young people who were born to religious parents, and switched to 'no religion' (Shy, 2007, 
p. 1133). However, a state-religion and state-regulation of religion also typically involve   6
subsidies, such as: payments to church employees, favourable tax schemes for the religion 
sector, building churches and religious institutions, subsidies to religious schools and 
curricula, and collection of taxes dedicated to church uses. Economic speculation suggests 
that these subsidies would encourage religious activity (more personnel and improved 
facilities attract more churchgoers) and create a positive effect on religious participation. 
The overall effect of state-religion and state-regulation on religious participation is 
therefore ambiguous.  
At the other end, the literature presents long-standing demand-side views that claim the 
very opposite: more diversity leads to less participation (higher secularization). In countries 
with a diversity of religious denominations, individuals are exposed to a variety of religion 
products and this might weaken their ties with the religion they were raised in (e.g. Kelley, 
1977; Sherkat, 1991). The process of disaffiliation is further magnified by intermarriage. If 
there is a dominant denomination, a high proportion of marital unions will bring together 
two people with the same religious affiliation. On the other hand, in a multi-religion 
country there are higher prospects of intermarriage. Intermarriage reduces the probability of 
religious affiliation for the offspring and increases the likelihood of disaffiliation for the 
spouses (Voas, 2003). 
The conflicting effects that religious diversity has on religious affiliation leaves, 
therefore, the question of the observed relationship between religious diversity  and 
secularization unanswered. A considerable amount of empirical work has explored this 
issue; some seem to support one side and some the other (see Chaves & Gorski, 2001, who 
presented a major review of 193 tests in 26 published articles). Negative effects of 
pluralism on religious activity were reported in Breault (1989a, 1989b) and in Olson 
(1999). They both argue against findings of a positive relationship that were presented in 
Finke and Stark (1988). In all probability, both supply and demand forces exist in society 
and both shape the relationship between religious diversity and secularization. The 
relationship's direction is determined by the more dominant force. 
(ii)After-life beliefs and religious behaviour: The second illustration is related to the 
topic of the present study, namely, differences between societies in the prevalence of   7
beliefs in the after-life (hell and heaven), and the differential effects of these two types of 
after-life beliefs on religious practice. 
Supply-side theories claim that church doctrine regarding the after-life is an endogenous 
variable used by the church to expropriate rent and/or to encourage appropriate social 
behaviour. Ekelund et al. (1989) suggest that church officials are using heaven and hell as 
tools to increase their material wealth: they promise heaven to those who transfer wealth to 
church officials and threaten hell to those who do not.  Hull and Bold (1989, 1994) argue 
that heaven and hell are effective methods for encouraging members to produce valuable 
social behaviour: "Heaven rewards desirable behaviour and hell increases the expected 
cost of misbehaviour, causing an increase in enforcement effectiveness" (Hull & Bold, 
1994, p. 449). Frank (1988) supports this argument by illustrating the potential influence 
heaven and hell can have in preventing undesirable opportunistic behaviour. Hull and Bold 
(1994) claim that a correlation exists between the developmental stage of a country and the 
prevalence of its population's religious doctrines, such as after-life beliefs. They predict that 
after-life religious doctrines  will be most important and effective in producing social goods 
in cultures with intermediate complexity of property rights, production technology, trade 
relations, and social interaction. The rationale for this assertion is the following: in simple 
cultures that are organized around extended families that share wealth and enforce 
appropriate family member behaviour, religious doctrines would be effective but are not 
needed. On the other hand, in very large and technologically complex communities, 
religious doctrines are needed but are less effective. Therefore, religious doctrines of 
heaven and hell will prevail mainly in countries with an intermediate level of development. 
They use data from the Human Relations Area Files that tend to support this model's 
prediction. In an attempt to test their prediction for more developed societies in 1998, we 
employed data of 32 countries from the 1998 ISSP data base and looked at the relationship 
between state development (measured by per-capita GDP) and intensity of belief in the 
after-life, but did not find any correlation pattern between these two elements (see section 
4.3). Therefore, our data do not support Hull and Bold’s prediction, which is grounded in 
supply-side theories.  
On the other hand, demand-side theories relate to the belief in heaven and hell as an 
exogenous variable. Doctrines of heaven and hell do not arise as a response to the need for   8
social order. Like many other beliefs they are formulated during childhood and transmitted 
from religious parents and teachers to the offspring (Brañas-Garza & Neuman, 2006, 2007; 
Bar-El, Neuman & Tobol, 2008). The sociological literature distinguishes between beliefs, 
attitudes, intentions, and behaviour. It assumes a causal chain linking beliefs to the person's 
attitudes; beliefs and attitudes to intentions; and intentions to behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975 p. vi and chap. 8. A summary of studies related to the chain “beliefs-attitudes-
intentions-behaviour” is presented in Table 8.1, pp. 337-339). 
Beliefs in the after-life (like other types of beliefs and norms) are most probably 
transmitted from one generation to the next and shaped during the formative years of 
childhood (see for instance: Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Bisin & Verdier, 2000, 2001; 
Brañas-Garza & Neuman, 2006). These beliefs then motivate believers to intensify their 
religious behaviour (demonstrated by church attendance and prayer) in order to enjoy 
heaven and avoid hell. It is belief that determines practice, rather than the other way 
around. The empirical analysis presented in this paper follows this demand-side theory and 
examines the association (in terms of existence and degree) between belief in heaven/hell 
and religious practice, expressed in the forms of church service attendance and prayer. 
2.2 Incentives and high-stakes incentives 
The promise of an after-life serves as an incentive for the believers to practice religious 
behaviour. 
There is a vast literature on incentives and their effect on performance.  Two types of 
incentives are suggested by the literature: (i) financial rewards; and (ii) pro-social 
incentives. The latter are more relevant for the performance of socially-valued actions.  
(i) The economics literature emphasizes monetary rewards and claims that rewards can 
positively affect performance. Experimental economics was used intensively to test this 
relationship between monetary rewards and performance (e.g., Smith & Wakker, 1993; 
Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001; Rydval & Ortmann, 2004)
6. In order to test the effectiveness of 
                                                 
6 Most experimental studies on the role of financial incentives ignore differences in cognitive production of 
respondents. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) argue that the interpretation of experimental results should be 
conditional not only on the particular financial incentives employed, but also on the cognitive abilities of the 
experiment's participants. Rydval and Ortmann (2004), drawing on the data in Gneezy and Rustchini (2000a),   9
increased financial payments on economic behavior high-stakes financial rewards have 
been offered in several experimental designs. Slonim and Roth (1998) and List and Cherry 
(2000) tested the Ultimatum Game under high-stakes incentives (up to 25 times larger than 
the standard). They found that while under standard incentives, players (both proposers and 
responders) rarely played a Nash Equilibrium game, when incentives were substantially 
enlarged the percentage of subjects who played a Nash Equilibrium Ultimatum Game 
increased accordingly. Contrary to these results Oberholzer-Gee, Waldfogel and White 
(2003) did not find evidence for the magnified effect of high-stakes incentives in 
cooperative games. Also, List and Cherry (2008) did not find a high-stakes effect in 
Dictator Games. The results are therefore inconclusive (see Levitt & List, 2007).  
In a similar vein, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) claimed that the payment should be 
large enough for affecting effort and performance. These authors' results suggest (as 
succinctly summarized by the title of their paper: "Pay enough or don't pay at all") that the 
experimenter ought to pay enough or not pay at all. They conjectured that their minimally 
paid subjects might have been insulted by the microscopic compensation offered to them 
and consequently performed worse than subjects who were driven only by their intrinsic 
motivation. 
(ii) Social motivation is prevalent in actions that have a social/religious/moral aspect 
(see Andreoni, 2007; and Meier, 2007, for surveys on experimental evidence for pro-social 
preferences). Examples are blood donation (e.g., Ferrari, Barone, Jason & Rose, 2001; 
Goette & Stutzer, 2008; Mellstrom & Johannesson, 2008) and charity (Gneezy & 
Rustchini, 2000a; Frey & Meier, 2004; Landry, Lange, List, Price & Rupp, 2006). It was 
argued that adding financial benefits to pro-social activities can undermine the motivation, 
lead to “crowding out” and eventually to less pro-social behavior (Titmuss, 1971). The 
"crowding out" hypothesis was initially met with skepticism by economists (Solow, 1971). 
Later on, economists found experimental evidence for the "crowding out" theory (see Frey 
& Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; and Frey & Jegen, 2001, for a survey of such empirical evidence) 
and developed different economic models to explain the empirical evidence (Gneezy & 
Rustchini, 2000b; Benabou & Tirole, 2006; Sliwka, 2007; Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2008).  
                                                                                                                                                     
show that the effects of financial incentives on performance were less important than cognitive abilities of the 
respondents.    10
In this paper we look at a different type of incentives that are neither financial nor pro-
social. The reward for a religiously practicing individual is believed to be received in the 
after-life. Those who definitely believe in heaven and/or hell are confident (subjective 
probability of 100%) that they will be highly rewarded (or punished) after death and 
therefore after-life is an example of high-stakes incentives for religious behavior
7. The 
question is therefore if these incentives also affect performance (participation in mass 
services and praying) as predicted by the incentives literature. Another interesting question 
is whether financial rewards that would be granted to religiously practicing individuals, will 
“crowd out” the after-life incentives and eventually lead to less religious practice. This is a 
hypothetical question that can not be tested with our data base. Also, church attendees 
might have other incentives too for attending church services, such as net-working and 
social incentives. It is not possible to disentangle the after-life and the social incentives. 
However, praying, which is a private/intimate religious activity, does not have any social 
dimensions. The effect of belief in after-life and religious performance is therefore clearer 
and cleaner in the context of praying. 
2.3 The effectiveness of punishment and loss aversion (positive vs. negative incentives) 
Hull and Bold (1989) raise the question: "why invent hell?' (page 450). Why wouldn't 
the church simply increase without limit the rewards in heaven rather than also increasing 
the cost of misbehaviour by threatening punishment in hell? The answer they give is that 
the introduction of unpleasant hell is more effective in altering individual behaviour than an 
increase in the claimed wealth in heaven, due to diminishing marginal effects of utility of 
heaven.  
There is a vast literature on punishment as a powerful device for the enforcement of 
contracts and cooperation and for reducing anti-social behavior (e.g., Andreoni et al., 2003; 
Nikiforakis, 2008). It was also suggested that individuals are ready to pay to punish others 
(altruistic punishment) if those subjects are selfish or do not behave according to accepted 
social rules (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher, 2005). 
Moreover, in a recent paper, Nonneman (2007) showed that the effectiveness of the 
threat of punishment (not even actual punishment) was already acknowledged almost four 
                                                 
7 One of the referees mentioned that we deal with belief in incentives, rather than incentives per se. However, 
as we relate only to absolute believers, the believer relates to heaven/hell as a certain incentive.   11
centuries ago: the Socialist Theocracy of the Jesuits in Paraguay, “La Misión” (1609-1767), 
was successfully run with the help of indoctrination instead of punishment.  
Reference-dependent loss aversion theories can also be used to explain the effectiveness 
of hell in guaranteeing proper behaviour: the absolute subjective value of a change in an 
endowment is generally greater when the deviation from the reference point represents a 
loss than when the same-sized change is perceived as a gain. It follows that if the reference 
point is no after-life, individuals will attach a higher (negative) value to the loss of utility in 
hell than to the gain of utility in heaven.  
The most systematic general theory of this kind is probably Tversky and Kahneman's 
(1991) reference-dependence model, which builds on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
Prospect Theory. Numerous studies present evidence supporting the loss aversion hypothe-
sis. They include: Hartman, Doane and Woo (1991); Hardie, Johnson and Fader (1993); 
Andreoni (1995); Benartzi and Thaler (1995); Camerer, Babcock, Loewnstein and Thaler 
(1997); Myagkov and Plott (1998); Bowman, Minehart and Rabin (1999); Jullien and 
Salanie (2000); Genesove and Mayer (2001); Neuman and Neuman (2008). 
In a recent paper, Harinck, Van Dijk, Van Beest and Mersmann (2007) showed that loss 
aversion can be reversed (in their words: "gains loom larger than losses") when small 
amounts of money are concerned. It appears that individuals happily accept small gains but 
discount small losses. They also found typical loss aversion (losses loom larger than gains) 
for larger amounts of money. Although their results were replicated in several experiments 
using different settings and paradigms, more evidence is needed before a general 
conclusion is drawn. 
As we are dealing with high-stakes after-life incentives, losses should loom larger than 
gains. It follows that belief in hell (loss) is assumed to be more effective in promoting 
active religious behaviour (such as participation in church activities and prayer) than belief 
in heaven (gain).  
This study explored two basic questions: (i) is religious behaviour affected by (high-
stakes, non-monetary) incentives, so that performance is significantly correlated with the 
definite belief in heaven/hell?; (ii) are believers in heaven/hell loss averse in the sense that 
losses (hell) loom larger than gains (heaven), and consequently, the absolute belief in hell   12
would have a stronger effect on religious performance than the absolute belief in heaven? 
To the best of our knowledge, the application of theories of incentives and loss aversion to 
religious performance is an innovative endeavour, not reported in the existing literature. 
 
3   The framework, sample, variables and econometric model 
3.1 Framework 
Following the A-E model (Azzi & Ehrenberg, 1975)
8 it is assumed that subjects have a 
quasi-concave utility function: 
  1,..., , n uc c c h    
where  t c  represents the terrene consumption of goods and services in period t and h is the 
expected value of eternal bliss  hR R
   . Following A-E (see footnote 9, p. 33) we 
also assume that the eternal bliss is a continuous, differentiable, concave function of the 
individual's effort by means of church-attendance   t a  and prayer   t p  in each period 
  12 1 , ,..., , ,..., nn hh a a ap p  . 
It follows that individuals invest in religious activities in order to reach heaven and to avoid 
hell. Our analysis builds upon two major assumptions
9: 
1.  A crucial assumption is that people trust that the attendance of church services and 
private prayer are good strategies in the salvation game: reaching heaven and 
avoiding hell. 
2.  We are also assuming that the valuations of heaven (h
+) and hell (h
-) are identical in 
absolute terms: infinite gain versus infinite loss. This assumption is crucial for a 
comparative analysis of the effects of heaven versus hell. Two explanatory variables 
are included in the regression analysis: absolute belief in heaven and in hell. The 
                                                 
8 Pyne (2008) uses a different approach based on subjective probabilities. This approach is much more 
convenient than ours but more theoretically complex. We selected the A-E approach because its simplicity.  
9 We acknowledge comments of the two referees who suggested elaborating on these points. One of the 
referees noted that beliefs in heaven/hell are correlated with the subject’s level of religiosity. In order to 
control for the respondent's level of religiosity we add to the regression analysis “self-reported” level of 
religiosity as one of the explanatory variables.   13
“stay in grave” alternative therefore serves as the reference group. An individual 
who believes neither in heaven nor in hell belongs to the default group of those who 
believe that after death there is no after-life and people "stay in grave"     0 h .   
Hence, assuming that church attendance and prayer are strategies that lead to heaven 
and prevent hell, we explore: 
(1) if absolute belief in eternal bliss (heaven/gain) increases individual’s religious 
investment that is reflected in church attendance and prayer. Same for absolute 
belief in eternal damnation (hell/loss), and 
(2) if absolute belief in eternal damnation (hell/loss) is a more or less powerful 
incentive compared to eternal bliss (heaven/gain) for  intensified religious effort.  
We therefore compare the effects of positive versus negative incentives, by estimating 
the effects of heaven/hell incentives on religious performance (church attendance and 
prayer).  
Church attendance and prayer are two dimensions of religiosity that reflect public 
religious activities versus private/intimate prayer activities. While church attendance has 
also non-religious motives, such as networking and establishing social ties, the private 
prayer activity has more pure religious motives
10. An interesting question is whether the 
heaven/hell incentives play different roles in promoting the two different types of religious 
activity. A comparison of coefficients of church attendance and prayer equations will 
facilitate an answer to this question. 
3.2 Sample 
The data used for the empirical analysis were drawn from the module on National 
Identity of the 1998 International Social Survey Program (ISSP): Religion II. The ISSP is 
an ongoing effort devoted to cross-country research on national attitudes. It includes 
questions on attitudes, beliefs and opinions on various issues, as well as numerous 
questions regarding the individual’s socio-economic background, together with information 
on parents and spouses. Individuals were sampled within the following 32 countries: 
Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, France, West Germany, East 
                                                 
10 The motives of private prayer are basically religious rather than social. However, prayer habits could also 
stem from endogenized social rules or personal needs.   14
Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Japan, Israel, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, New Zealand, 
Northern Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, 
The Czech Republic, The Netherlands, The Philippines, The Slovak Republic, and The 
United States. 
Most of these countries are predominantly Christian (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, 
Lutheran, Anglican and other Christian faith). The sample is composed of Catholics - 45%; 
Protestants – 14.6%; Orthodox – 6.9%; Lutherans – 2.7%; a small share of respondents are 
Jewish (4%) or  Moslem (1.1%); about 7.5% have other religions (e.g. Sikh, Buddhist, 
Hindu, Shinto, Free Presbyterian, Pentecostal, Mormon, Brethren, Episcopal); and 18.2% 
identify themselves as having ‘no religion’. The data covers the European and Australian 
continents and North America. The African continent is excluded and South America and 
Asia are represented by a small number of countries (Chile, Israel, Japan and the 
Philippines). The research, therefore, pertains to Europe, North-America, and a few other 
countries. The more homogenous European sample is also analysed separately.  
In order to arrive at an even more religiously homogenous sample, a sub-sample of the 
European countries that includes predominantly Catholic countries (where over 85% of the 
population is Catholic) was selected and analysed. This sub-sample includes: Spain, Italy, 
Poland, Ireland, and Portugal.  
Regression results for the three groups are presented and compared. Regressions were 
estimated using pooled country data, under the assumption that the effects of the 
independent variables are not different in the various countries included in the sample. The 
pooling of the data led to a very large sample (sample sizes within each of the countries 
were too small to allow a separate analysis for each country). Country specific variables 
were used to identify and control for country effects
11. 
3.2 Dependent variables and econometric approach 
Two questions included in this dataset were used to define the two dependent variables 
(churchgoing and prayer): 
                                                 
11 Another option was to use fixed-effects regression models. The basic results for the core variables did not 
change when fixed-effects were used.   15
o  Church (religious services) attendancei: is based on the question “How often do you 
attend religious services at a church?” and has six options: (1) never; (2) once a year; 
(3) two or three times a year; (4) once a month; (5) two or three times a month; and 
(6) at least once a week.  
The term 'church' is used as a generic term that relates to the relevant religious place of 
worship (e.g., also synagogue for Jews, mosque for Moslems, etc.). The religious rules of 
congregation vary between religions (e.g., many orthodox Jews congregate once or even 
twice a day, while Christians congregate once a week). However, the six categories of the 
question related to church attendance have levels that minimize this problem. For instance, 
the upper category is 'at least once a week', and it covers the most observant respondents 
from all religions. 
o  Prayeri: is based on the question “How often do you pray?” that has eleven 
alternative categories: (1) never; (2) once a year; (3) twice a year; (4) few times a year; 
(5) about once a month; (6) two or three times a month; (7) almost every week; (8) 
every week; (9) several times a week; (10) once a day; and (11) several times a day.  
Here too, prayer obligations vary between religions (e.g., Jews need to pray 3 times a 
day; Moslems 5 times a day), but the upper category of 'several times a day' encompasses 
the most observant respondents. Church attendance is a public activity, whereas prayer is a 
private/intimate religious activity that has pure religious motives.  
Ordered Logit models were estimated in order to utilize the full information on the 
dependent variables. In these estimations, the equations have a non-linear form. While 
interpretation of the coefficients in this model is difficult, the signs of the coefficients and 
their relative values provide important insights into the effects of the predictors of the 
model (see Brañas-Garza & Neuman, 2004, 2006 for more on Ordered Logit estimation of 
religious practice equations). 
3.3 Independent variables 
We used the following list of independent variables for the two sets of regressions 
(church-attendance and praying equations): 
i)  Dummy variables related to beliefs in heaven (carrot) and in hell (stick): These are 
our core variables and they were defined based on the following original dataset variables:    16
o  Heaveni: is based on the question: “Do you believe in heaven?” that has four 
options:  (1)  yes, definitely; (2)  yes, probably; (3)  no, probably not; and (4)  no, 
definitely not. 
o  Helli: is based on the question: “Do you believe in hell?” that has the same four 
options:  (1)  yes, definitely; (2)  yes, probably; (3)  no, probably not; and (4)  no, 
definitely not. 
Using these questions we defined the following explanatory variables regarding positive 
incentives (carrot), punishment (stick), and the lack of both (no-carrot; no-stick): 
  Carroti that takes the value of 1 if Heaveni = 1 (that is, the respondent 
definitely believes in heaven) and 0 otherwise
12. 
  Sticki  = 1 if Helli = 1 (the respondent definitely believes in hell) and 0 
otherwise. 
  No-carroti that takes the value of 1 if Heaveni = 4 (that is, the respondent 
definitely does not believe in heaven) and 0 otherwise. 
  No-sticki = 1 if Helli = 4 and 0 otherwise (the respondent definitely does not 
believe in hell). 
Obviously, an individual who absolutely  believes in heaven (hell) faces a standard 
“profit” maximization problem (see footnote 26 below). He relates to heaven (hell) as a 
100% certain personal return (penalty) on his investment (lack of investment) in religious 
performance that is expressed in church attendance and private prayer. Moreover, the size 
of the premium and of the penalty will be “infinitum” or at least extremely large
13.  
In order to control for other variables that also affect religious performance, and hence 
arrive at net effects of the heaven/hell incentives, the following explanatory variables were 
also included: 
ii)  Dummy variables related to the religious practice of the father, the mother, and the 
respondent when he was 12 years old: The ISSP provides information on church attendance 
                                                 
12 The category of believers (non-believers) includes only those individuals who chose the definitely yes (no) 
option. We also experimented with an alternative definition that added in the subjects who chose the probably 
yes (no) option to the group of believers (non-believers). The regression coefficients of the relevant variables 
changed accordingly but the pattern and conclusions did not change. We report the results that relate to the 
'definite' option. Index Table A6 presents regression results for the broader category of the 'definitely + 
probably' option. 
13 With hyperbolic discounting, the present value of infinite rewards is infinite. However, with exponential or 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the present value of eternal bliss is finite (but still large). See Elster (2007), pp. 
117-119.   17
of the respondent’s father and mother and his own participation at church activities at the 
age of 12, by asking: “when you were a child, how often did your father/mother/yourself 
attend church services?” The answer includes 9 categories ranging from (1) never; to (9) 
several times a week. The ISSP (1991 and 1998) appear to be the only multi-nation surveys 
to ask retrospective church attendance questions
14. 
While retrospective data are frequently questioned for their reliability, there is no reason 
to presume that people have special difficulties in recalling their religious backgrounds. 
Childhood attendance is a distinctive and well-defined activity, not easily confused with 
other activities, nor easily forgotten altogether. Individual rates of attendance tend not to 
vary much over time, thus limiting problems associated with the misdating of memories. 
People rarely confuse their childhood and adult experiences, and childhood is the only 
period when most people routinely observe their parents’ religious activities. Iannaccone 
(2003) tests the reliability of ISSP retrospective attendance data by comparing them to GSS 
American data; American Catholic Surveys conducted in 1963 and 1974 by NORC; and 
additional evidence from surveys conducted in Canada the US and Europe. He reaches the 
conclusion the ISSP data “stand up to numerous different tests of internal and external 
consistency” (p. 34)
15. Three dummy variables, based on the retrospective data for church 
attendance of father/mother/child at 12, were defined:  
  Intensively practicing father=1; if the father attended church services almost 
every week (categories (7); (8); or (9)). 
  Intensively practicing mother=1; if the mother attended church services 
almost every week (same three categories). 
  Intensively practicing child=1; if the respondent, when he was 12 years old, 
attended church services almost every week (same three categories). 
By not relating to a numerical variable and by combining three categories, we further 
minimize measurement errors resulting from the retrospective nature of the data.  
                                                 
14 There is a major American survey, The General Social Surveys (GSS), that included analogous questions in 
1983-1986, 1988 and 1989 (Davis & Smith, 1998), but they were administrated only in the US. 
15 He even becomes poetic when he summarizes: “Stop making do with scattered historical statistics, and tap 
the comprehensive history we collectively carry in our minds. Stop grinding the same old survey questions 
through ever more complex calculations, and begin mining the global storehouse of retrospective data. Let 
others wait for decades of polls spanning dozens of countries; reconstruct the past now” (p. 33).   18
iii)  Self-reported religiosity level. This variable is used to control for interpersonal 
differences in the importance that religion plays in the subject's life. Proper control of this 
personal feature facilitates the estimation of net effects of afterlife beliefs on religious 
activity. The variable religiosity level includes 7 categories: extremely religious, very 
religious, somewhat religious, neither religious nor non-religious, somewhat non-religious, 
very non-religious, extremely non-religious (our reference group). 
iv)   The list of socio-demographic variables includes:  
  age in years (four categories: over 60; 46-59; 31-45; 30 or below - as the 
reference group); 
  education (three levels: academic education (full or partial); high school; 
elementary -  as the reference group);  
  marital status (married =1);  
  family size (number of people in household ); 
  The spouse defines his religious affiliation as ‘no religion’=1.   
v)  We also controlled for country specific variables:  
  per-capita GDP of the respondent’s country (1998, in 2000 US$)
16 ; 
  country average level of church-attendance (in church-attendance equations) 
and  country average level of prayer (in prayer equations). 
 
4   Findings: Descriptive data and regression analysis 
4.1 Sample characteristics 
Table 1 presents the cross-distribution of the Stick/Carrot core variables. Three parallel 
cross-distributions are shown: for the whole sample (all the countries included in the 
survey); for European countries (both Catholics and non-Catholics); and for European 
predominantly Catholic countries (Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Poland)
17. The 
estimation of church attendance and prayer equations will also be repeated for these three 
sets of countries.  
                                                 
16 Source: ERS International Macroeconomic Data Set (http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/). 
17 The religious homogeneity of the populations (in European countries and mainly in European Catholic 
countries) also helps to overcome the problem of different perceptions of 'heaven' and 'hell' within different 
religions, e.g., in Japan, the majority of the population are both Shinto and Mahayana Buddhists – for them 
the concepts 'heaven' and 'hell' in the infinitum sense are irrelevant. You may reside for a time in a hell or 
heaven world – but you then reincarnate again.   19
The whole sample included valid data for 33,597 individuals, out of whom 28.2% 
absolutely believe in heaven and 21.8% absolutely believe in hell. These percentages are 
smaller for European countries and higher for European Catholic ones. The cross-
distribution demonstrates that not everybody who believes (disbelieves) in after-life 
rewards automatically believes (disbelieves) in after-life punishment. Around 21% believe 
in both (25.2% in the European Catholic countries), whereas 71.2% (64.4% in the European 
Catholic countries) do not believe (definitely) neither in the carrot nor in the stick. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Belief in heaven is more common than belief in hell, leading to a sub-set of 7% of 
individuals (9.9% in the European Catholic countries) who believe in heaven but not in 
hell. We do not have many observations for the “only punishment” case, i.e., for those who 
believe in hell but not in heaven (196, 143 and 32 individuals respectively)
18. 
Appendix Table A2 presents descriptive statistics on the various variables employed in 
the regression analysis. 
The next section explores the effect of incentives on church-attendance and on praying, 
as reflected by the religious practice equations. 
4.2 Religious-practice estimation results 
Ordered Logit regression was used to estimate religious practice equations. The 
dependent variables are church attendance (six ordered values) and prayer (eleven ordered 
values). 
A comparison of the results for the three sets of countries will help to answer the 
question of whether the effects of the carrot/stick on religious practice are religion-specific 
or whether they are more universal and not dependent on the religious make-up of the 
country under discussion. Regressions were run separately for females and males as is 
common in the literature (see Brañas-Garza & Neuman, 2004). For each case, the list of 
                                                 
18 Appendix Table A1 presents parallel figures that relate to the broader definitions of carrot/stick, so that 
believers are defined as also those who say that they 'probably believe'. The categories of believers obviously 
grow (52.5% believe in the carrot/heaven and 41% believe in the stick/hell). However, the mixed categories 
do not change dramatically: here too only 0.6% believe in hell but not in heaven (identical to the figure in 
Table 1) and 12.1% believe in heaven but not in hell (compared to 7% when the stricter definition is used in 
Table 1).   20
independent variables included our two core variables that relate to incentives (positive or 
negative); the dummy variables for an intensively practicing father/mother/respondent at 
age 12; self-reported religiosity; the set of socio-demographic variables; and country-
specific variables (see previous section). 
Table 2 presents the coefficients of the two core variables for each Ordered Logit 
equation, namely, church attendance and prayer. Two versions were used in order to 
contribute to the robustness of the results: 
The top part of the Table (Equations A) presents coefficients of the variables that relate 
to absolute belief in heaven/hell, while the bottom part (Equation B) reports the coefficient 
for the alternative version that relates to the effect of the absolute disbelief variables. The 
effects are expected to be reversed and if the carrot and stick have differential effects on 
religious performance, it is expected to be reflected in the two versions. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The full regressions (Type A) that also include the coefficients of the control variables 
are presented in Appendix Tables A3, A4, and A5, and are briefly described below. The 
coefficients of the control variables in the Type B version were very similar.  
The results are impressive. Examining the results for the whole sample we see that:  
  First, afterlife beliefs have a major effect on religious practice. Both the positive 
(heaven/carrot) and the negative (hell/stick) incentives have significant positive 
effects on the two variants of religious practice. Belief in heaven and in hell 
increases participation in mass services and increases prayer habits, while disbelief 
has the opposite effect.  
  Second, the effect of the carrot (heaven) is much more pronounced than the effect of 
the stick (hell). For both the church attendance and the prayer equations and within 
both the male and the female samples, the coefficient of belief in heaven is 
approximately  three times larger than the coefficient of belief in hell. This is true 
for the dummy variables that reflect absolute beliefs and also for those that relate to   21
the absolute lack of beliefs
19. These empirical findings clearly indicate that 
anticipated rewards have a much more pronounced effect on religious practice than 
expected penalties. 
  Third, there seem to be gender differences, mainly regarding the effect of belief 
(disbelief) in Heaven: the effect is larger for men. Gender differences are even more 
obvious when prayer is examined. It appears that although absolute belief in heaven 
is less common among men (percentages of 24.6 and 31.4 for men and women, 
respectively, within the whole sample), after-life incentives play a more pronounced 
role in shaping men’s religious behaviour.  
  Fourth, in order to control for individual religious heterogeneity (that is correlated 
with belief/disbelief in heaven/hell and obviously affects religious behaviour), self-
reported level of religiosity is used as an additional explanatory control variable (see 
tables A3, A4 and A5). The effects of the carrot/stick that are reported in Table 2 
are therefore net effects on top of the effect of religiosity level.  
  Fifth, in order to deal more explicitly with the sub-group of respondents who 
believe in the "stay in grave" alternative, the regression analysis was repeated for a 
more restricted sample that excluded those individuals who reported that they do not 
believe in the after-life
20. The core results did not change (available upon request). 
Results are very similar when the sample is restricted to the European countries. The 
differences in the effects of the carrot seem to grow larger within the European sample, 
especially for church attendance of men. Interestingly, within the sample of European 
Catholic countries, both the carrot and the stick have smaller effects on prayer. Moreover, 
the effect of 'hell' (stick) is not significant
21. 
                                                 
19 Beliefs (disbeliefs) in heaven and in hell are highly correlated, leading to multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity could result in insignificance of one or two of the correlated variables. However, all 
coefficients are significant in the equations for the whole sample and the European sample. The problem of 
multicollinearity is eliminated if interaction terms between beliefs in heaven and hell are introduced instead of 
the two main-effects variables (see below). The basic results did not change. Additionally we run 3 measures 
of multicollinearity: Tolerance, Variance Inflation Factor, and the Condition Number. All of them support the 
absence of multicollinearity. Moreover, as one of the referee notes, the stability of the results over various 
sub-samples is a good argument in our favour.  
20 Individuals who claimed that they “do not belief in heaven” and “do not belief in hell” and “do not believe 
in afterlife” were removed from the sample. The sample decreased by about 20%. 
21 The insignificance could result from multicollinearity that is more pronounced in the Catholic sample. 
Regressions that included only the 'hell' variable resulted in a significant coefficient, e.g. in the church 
attendance equations: the coefficient of 'hell' in the male regression that included 'hell' only was 0.706   22
We also experimented with the introduction of interaction terms between definite belief 
in heaven and hell, instead of the two variables employed in the regressions presented in 
Table 2. Three interaction terms were included:  
  Definite belief  in both heaven and hell=1;  
  Definite belief  in heaven but not in hell=1; 
  Definite belief in hell and not in heaven=1.  
The reference group was therefore: believes neither in heaven nor in hell. The results 
were similar.  
For instance, analyzing the whole male sample, the estimation of church attendance 
equations leads to the following estimates of the three coefficients: (i) coefficient of 1.13 
(p<0.001) for belief in both the carrot and stick; (ii) belief in heaven but not hell results in a 
coefficient of 0.70 (p<0.001); and (iii) belief only in hell but not heaven, leads to an 
insignificant coefficient of -1.158 (p=0.074).   
This version as well clearly shows that the two after-life incentives have a significant 
effect on the respondent’s intensity of church attendance. However, the carrot has a much 
more pronounced impact compared to the stick. The use of the three interaction terms also 
solves the problem of correlation between belief in heaven and hell (leading to 
multicollinearity). However, the introduction of only the two primary variables (definite 
belief in heaven and definite belief in hell) results in a more compact exposition and was 
preferred (results of regressions of the ‘interaction variables’ version can be obtained from 
the authors).  
To conclude, we illustrated that incentives have a major effect on religious behaviour 
and that positive incentives have a much stronger effect than negative ones, when both are 
available. This result is basically similar to that proposed in the cooperation experiments 
described in Andreoni et al. (2003), where carrots (only) were much more effective than 
sticks (only). However we do not find their multiplicative “carrot-stick” effect since we 
observe that the added value of punishment is really poor. 
Appendix Tables A3 (full sample), A4 (European sample), and A5 (European Catholic 
sample) present the full type A regressions, including the coefficients of the independent 
                                                                                                                                                     
(p=0.000), compared to a coefficient of 0.827 (p=0.000) in the equation that included 'heaven' only. The 
respective coefficients for 'hell' and 'heaven' in the female regressions were: 0.515 (p=0.000) and 0.652 
(p=0.000).   23
variables that were used as controls. Results of the control independent variables are very 
similar in equations of type B.  
As it is evident from Appendix Tables A3, A4, and A5, exposure to religious intensive 
church attendance during the formative years of childhood (indicated by an intensively 
practicing father, mother, and the respondent at the age of 12) affects positively the 
respondents’ religious performance as adults. Male respondents followed much more 
closely the father than the mother, in the three samples (for instance, in the Catholic 
sample, the coefficients of the attendance equation are 0.664 and 0.245 for the father and 
mother, respectively).  
Interestingly, prayer habits of women are affected mainly by the mother. The effect of 
the father is insignificant within all samples. The father has a significant effect on men’s 
prayer habits (the effect of the mother is insignificant, for a significant level 5% or less).  
As expected, the importance of religion in the subject's life (expressed by the self-
reported level of religiosity, ranging from 'extremely religious' to 'extremely non-religious') 
is positively and significantly related to religious activity. Religious level seems to have a 
stronger effect on prayer habits than on church-attendance (within the European Catholic 
countries the effects on church-attendance and on prayer are similar) probably because 
church-attendance has also net-working motives while prayer has mainly religious motives.  
As expected, a spouse who is not affiliated with any religion has a pronounced negative 
effect on the intensity of religious practice of the partner. Marital status has a significant 
effect: Married individuals tend to go more frequently to church and married females tend 
to pray less (for males the coefficient of marital status is insignificant in the prayer 
equations). However, within the Catholic countries, the coefficient for ‘married’ is 
significant only for church attendance of men. The number of household members seems to 
affect positively religious performance. Larger families exhibit higher levels of church 
attendance and praying. In this case too, the Catholics behave a bit differently: Only men’s 
church-going is affected by the household size. 
Religious practice (both church attendance and prayer) increases with age, in particular 
after the respondent reaches the age of 60 (significant coefficients in all regressions). The 
effects on prayer are more pronounced. We observe gender differences in the effect of age,   24
with women exhibiting a more constant and monotonic age-related growth in religious 
practice. 
More educated men tend to participate in church activities more often than their less 
educated counterparts. The positive effect of education is less pronounced for women, 
probably because educated men enjoy the net-working effects of the church more than 
women. The effect of education on prayer is less obvious and for women it seems to be 
negative. 
 
4.3 Further discussion: national effects 
Respondents who live in more religious countries are practicing more intensively both in 
relation to church-going and prayer.  
The country per-capita GDP variable is significant in several of the regressions but does 
not show a clear pattern as a predictor of religious performance: in some cases it is positive, 
in some negative, and in others insignificant. 
In order to dwell a bit deeper into the relationship between the country’s level of 
development (as expressed by per-capita GDP) and its religiosity, as expressed in the 
percentage of true absolute believers in heaven/hell, we ranked the countries included in the 
dataset by per-capita GDP (from lowest - The Philippines – with US$905; to the highest – 
Norway – with US$37,931; Per-capita GDP figures are for 1998, expressed in US$ in 
constant prices for 2000) and plotted per-capita GDP against the percentage of absolute 
believers. Figure 1 presents the bar-diagram for belief in heaven. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
As is evident from the diagram, there is no clear pattern. A very similar chart is obtained 
for per-capita GDP versus belief in hell. These descriptive findings do not support the 
hypothesis that is presented in Hull and Bold (1994). They use a supply-side theory and 
claim that religious reward and punishment are most effective in cultures with an 
intermediate level of development. It follows that it is expected to find the highest levels of 
belief in heaven/hell in countries with intermediate per-capita GDP. It is clear from Figure 
1 that this is not the pattern we observe in 1998. The highest percentages of believers are   25
found at the two tails of the distribution (in the Philippines, Chile, and the United States) 
rather than in its middle part. If the examination is restricted to European countries only, we 
do find some tendency of more intensity of belief in heaven within countries that belong to 
the intermediate levels of per-capita GDP.  
The ISSP 1998 data presented above is also not in line with the predictions of Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales (2003) who suggested that religious beliefs affect positively 
economic performance of individuals and consequently the country’s development level. 
As is evident from Figure 1, there is no clear correlation between belief in heaven and 
economic success: The Philippines who exhibit the highest rates of belief in after-life, have 
the lowest per-capita GDP, while several of the countries the the highest per-capita GDP 
levels, have extremely low percentages of believers in after-life (e.g. Japan, Sweden and 
Denmark).  
 
5   Concluding remarks 
This study employs valid data of more than 35 thousand personal records from 32 
countries to explore the effect of high-stakes incentives (eternal rewards and penalties) on 
religious performance. The regression analysis shows that beliefs are relevant in religious 
performance and that when both positive (heaven) and negative (hell) incentives are 
available, the former are much more effective than the latter. These findings are confirmed 
for the full sample that includes various religions, and also for the two more homogeneous 
sub-samples of European countries and of five predominantly European Catholic countries.  
In order to arrive at net effects of the incentives stemming from the carrot (heaven) and 
stick (hell) and to further explore the determinants of religious practice, the analysis also 
included a series of personal socio-demographic variables (education, age, marital status, 
etc.). Self-reported religiosity and exposure to religious practice during the formative years 
of childhood were used as explanatory variables (mother/father/child at 12 were practicing 
intensively, as reflected by weekly-or more frequent- church attendance). Additionally, 
national characteristics (religious and economic performance) were also included in order 
to control for country differences. All in all, we found that definite beliefs in heaven and 
hell are crucial motivations behind religious activity. Belief in heaven has a major effect 
and belief in hell lags behind, with a secondary effect.    26
The very special nature of the incentive system and of the data base analyzed in this 
paper leads to several salient implications: 
  Our basic results seem to be similar for the religions represented in the data set and 
not religion-specific. This is indicated by the very similar results that were obtained 
from the repeated statistical analyses within: (i) a heterogeneous sample that 
consists of about 33,000 respondents affiliated with diverse religions; then (ii) for a 
more homogeneous sample of predominantly Christian European countries; and 
finally (iii) for the very homogeneous European Catholic sub-sample
22.  
  This study contributes to the literature on high-stakes incentives by presenting a 
‘case-study’ with colossal incentives: eternal bliss or eternal damnation. Although 
high-stakes incentives were used in several experiments (see Levitt & List, 2007 for 
a review), the use of infinite/enormous incentives is not possible within the lab or in 
field experiments. The very rich and broad ISSP data set made this examination 
feasible and led to the finding that in face of extremely high incentives, the positive 
ones (carrots) are much more effective than the negative ones (sticks). 
 
Two interesting related questions could be explored in future research:  
  Are heaven and hell representing same-sized gain and loss? The finding that heaven 
is more effective than hell in promoting religious behaviour, led us to the conjecture 
that in face of major after-life reward and punishment, individuals are not loss-
averse and are more pronouncedly affected by the reward. This conclusion is based 
on the pre-assumption that heaven and hell represent same-sized deviations from the 
base-line of “dead and in grave” and therefore have the same (reversed) stakes (see 
page 13). If this is not the case, and for many individuals heaven and hell do not 
have the same-sized (opposite) magnitudes then the conclusion becomes more 
                                                 
22 However, the results might be different for religions that have completely different after-life systems such 
as Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism etc. To give an example from Buddhism: After an individual dies, he is 
reborn and the place of his rebirth is determined by his Karma. One's thoughts feelings and actions in 
previous lives determine where he might be reborn. However, there is no external God/s deciding what will 
happen and no devil advocating punishment. It is a simple cause and effect system. Furthermore, while the 
notion of heaven and hell worlds does exist - meaning, one might be reborn in a heaven or hell world – they 
are not eternal and one will, at some point, be reborn in other realms, including the human one. Moreover, 
heaven and hell are not the most common continuation of life – but rather extreme possibilities. It is most 
likely to be reborn again without going through heaven of hell. It follows that when the ISSP questionnaire 
was completed by Japanese respondents they probably referred to a different notion of heaven/hell.    27
complex. A perception of hell as more powerful than heaven increases the 
robustness of the assertion that there is evidence for behaviour that is not risk-
averse: a more powerful negative incentive has a smaller effect than a positive 
inferior incentive. However, if heaven is perceived as the larger incentive, then the 
increased size of the positive incentive might be responsible for its larger effect on 
religious behaviour. 
  What are the discount rates of the future reward in heaven and the future 
punishment in hell? In most experiments that examined high-stakes incentives the 
benefits were immediate (e.g. electroshocks in Berns et al., 2007) and discounting 
was therefore irrelevant. However, heaven/hell relate to a postponed carrot/stick. 
After-life incentives are naturally subject to substantial unknown delay and are 
discounted by the decision-maker to their present net values. Is the individual using 
the same discount rate for both? This question too is relevant for the interpretation 
of the much stronger effect of belief in heaven as evidence for higher effectiveness 
of rewards compared to penalty. This interpretation assumes the same sizes and the 
same discounting rates. An alternative interpretation can be embedded in the 
possibly differential discounting of rewards and punishments: If the discount rate of 
hell is larger than the discount rate of heaven, then even if both are perceived as 
same-sized reward and punishment, the net discounted value of hell is smaller, 
leading to a lesser effect on religious performance. Discount rates of heaven and 
hell are unknown and can not be extracted from our data. Future research could try 
and look into this interesting question.  
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Table 1: Cross-Distributions of the Number (Percentage) of Believers/Non-believers in 
the Hell/Stick and Heaven/Carrot, 1998                                                    
 
Whole sample  Carrot=1 Carrot=0  Total 
Stick=1  7,131 (21.2%)  196 (0.6%)  7,327 (21.8%) 
Stick=0  2,355 (7.0%)  23,915 (71.2%)  26,270 (78.2%) 
Total  9,486 (28.2%)  24,111 (71.8%)  33,597 (100%) 
European countries  Carrot=1 Carrot=0  Total 
Stick=1  4,661 (17.8%)  143 (0.5%)  4,804 (18.3%) 
Stick=0  1,737 (6.6%)  19,707 (75.1%)  21,444 (81.7%) 
Total  6,398 (24.4%)  19,850 (75.6%)  26,248 (100%) 
European Catholic 
countries  Carrot=1 Carrot=0  Total 
Stick=1  1,509 (25.2%)  32 (0.5%)  1,521 (25.7%) 
Stick=0  594 (9.9%)  3,856 (64.4%)  4,450 (74.3%) 
Total  2,103 (35.1%)  3,888 (64.9%)  5,991 (100%) 
   36
 
Table 2: Ordered Logit Religious Practice Regressions, Carrot/Stick Variables, 1998 
  Whole Sample  European Countries  European Catholic Countries 
 ATTENDANCE  PRAYER  ATTENDANCE  PRAYER  ATTENDANCE  PRAYER 
Equations A  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Carrot (Heaven)  0.622 
(0.000) 
0.560 
(0.000)
0.869 
(0.000)
0.710 
(0.000) 
0.805 
(0.000) 
0.608 
(0.000) 
0.915 
(0.000)
0.744 
(0.000)
0.835 
(0.000) 
0.671 
(0.000)
0.690 
(0.000)
0.488 
(0.000) 
Stick (Hell)  0.221 
(0.008) 
0.099 
(0.127)
0.361 
(0.000)
0.210 
(0.001) 
0.200 
(0.040) 
0.241 
(0.002) 
0.228 
(0.012)
0.179 
(0.011)
0.006 
(0.972) 
-0.015 
(0.910)
0.202 
(0.172)
0.163 
(0.141) 
                 
Equations B  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
No carrot  -0.497 
(0.000) 
-0.487 
(0.000)
-0.980 
(0.000)
-0.838 
(0.000) 
-0.564 
(0.000) 
-0.477 
(0.000) 
-1.057 
(0.000)
-0.881 
(0.000)
-0.600 
(0.002) 
-0.680 
(0.000)
-1.027 
(0.000)
-0.724 
(0.000) 
No stick  -0.167 
(0.017) 
-0.085 
(0.123)
-0.025 
(0.705)
-0.069 
(0.190) 
-0.139 
(0.067) 
-0.119 
(0.045) 
0.089 
(0.229)
0.026 
(0.646)
-0.284 
(0.085) 
-0.072 
(0.586)
0.266 
(0.062)
-0.145 
(0.215) 
Sample size  11,022  12,979  11,651  13,503  8,741  10,608  9,268  11,081  1,998  2,591  2,246  2,725 
a)  Significance (p values) in parentheses 
b)  Sample sizes are smaller in Church Attendance equations, due to more missing values of the dependent variable. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Absolute Believers in Heaven, by Country (sorted by per-
capita GDP), 1998   38
APPENDIX -- TABLES 
Table A1: Cross-Distributions of the Number (Percentage) of Believers/Non-believers 
in the Stick (Hell) and Carrot (Heaven), using the Broader Definition of Belief/Non-
belief, 1998 
 
 
Whole sample  Carrot=1 Carrot=0  Total 
Stick=1  13,585 (40.4%)  194 (0.6%)  13,779 (41.0%) 
Stick=0  4,057 (12.1%)  15,761 (46.9%)  19,818 (59.0%) 
Total  17,642 (52.5%)  15,955 (47.4%)  33,597 (100%) 
European countries  Carrot=1  Carrot=0  Total 
Stick=1  9,660 (36.8%)  160 (0.6%)  9,820 (37.4%) 
Stick=0  3,197 (12.2%)  13,231 (50.4%)  16,428 (62.6%) 
Total  12,857 (49.0%)  13,391 (51.0%)  26,248 (100%) 
Catholic countries  Carrot=1 
  Carrot=0  Total 
Stick=1  3,131 (52.3%)  25 (0.4%)  3,156 (52.7%) 
Stick=0  881 (14.7%)  1,954 (32.6%)  2,835 (47.3%) 
Total  4,012 (67.0%)  1,979 (33.0%)  5,991 (100%) 
 
The individual was defined as a believer in the carrot (carrot=1)/stick (stick=1), if he chose the categories of 
“yes, definitely” or “yes, probably”   39
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables  
  All 
countries 
European 
countries 
European 
Catholic 
countries 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES     
Respondent’s attendance at church services (%)     
Never 28.7  27.9  11.6 
Once a year  18.7  19.5  9.6 
2-3 times a year  19.8  20.7  21.9 
Once a month  5.5  5.5  5.6 
2-3 times a month  7.9  7.9  13.0 
At least once a week  19.4  18.5  38.3 
Respondent’s frequency of praying at home (%)    
Never 26.8  28.7  10.5 
Once a year 4.4  4.6  2.7 
Twice a year  6.4  6.0  4.2 
Few times a year  10.0  10.3  10 
About once a month  3.6  3.7  3.1 
2-3 times a month  4.3 4.4 4.6 
Almost every week 4.7  5.0  7.0 
Every week 5.5  5.5  11.4 
Several times a week 8.9  9.0  17.1 
Once a day 16.5  15.6  20.5 
Several times a day  8.9  7.2  8.8 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES     
Definitely believes in Heaven (%) 29.7 25.2 38.8 
Definitely believes in Hell (%) 23.0  18.8  28.4 
Childhood experience (%)     
Father attended church services intensively  33.4  31.8  56.8 
Mother attended church services intensively  41.8  41.7  71.3 
Respondent attended church services intensively 
(at 12)  47.0 47.4 80.2 
Self-reported religiosity (%) 
Extremely religious 2.9 2.3 2.6 
Very religious 12.7 12.5 17.0 
Somewhat religious 36.9 36.7 54.8 
Neither religious nor non-religious 21.0 22.1 11.4 
Somewhat non-religious 10.7 10.8  9.8 
Very non-religious 8.9 8.7 2.4 
Extremely non-religious 6.9 6.9 2.0 
Marital variables     
Married (%) 61.3  60.8  63.7 
Married, spouse has no religion (%)  8.3  8.4  1.9 
Number of people in house. 3.2 (1.7)  3.1 (1.6)  3.4 (1.6)   40
Age in years (%) 
60 and over  21.5  22.8  27.1 
46-to-59 22.0  21.9  22.1 
31-to-45 31.2  30.6  27.3 
30 and under  25.3  24.7  23.5 
Education: last school attended (%) 
 Academic 40.5  38.8  36.9 
High School  39.7  39.7  29.3 
Elementary school  19.8  21.3  33.8 
Sample size 24,001  19,349  4,589 
a) Standard deviations in parentheses. 
b) Averages of personal characteristics were calculated using the samples that have been employed for 
the estimation of church-attendance equations. The samples used for estimation of prayer equations 
were somewhat larger (due to less missing values). The average characteristics were however very 
similar. The samples used for Table 1 were even larger (observations with missing values of the 
socio-economic variables were not excluded) and as a result the figures for definite believers in 
heaven/health are somewhat different from those reported in Table 1. 
c) In the questionnaires distributed in Israel and Bulgaria, the questions on church attendance were 
more detailed and included nine categories (compared to six categories in all other countries), 
probably due to the different religious requirements in Judaism and in the Christian Orthodox 
denomination. It was however possible to combine categories of the more detailed version and bring 
them down to the same six of the others.  
d) The averages of the country-specific variables are the following: (i) per-capita GDP (in 1998, 
expressed in US$, in 2000 constant prices): 15,656 (SD=10,962) within the whole sample; 14,759 
(SD=10,516) in the European countries; 13,144 (SD=5,561) in the Catholic countries; (ii) country 
average of church attendance in 1998 (ranges between 1-to-6): 2.1 (SD=0.8) within the full sample; 
2.0 (SD=0.8) in the European countries; 3.1 (SD=0.6) in the Catholic countries; and (iii) country 
average prayer habits (ranges between 1-to-11): 5.4 (SD=1.5) within the full sample; 5.2 (SD=1.4) in 
the European countries; 6.7 (SD=0.9) in the Catholic countries.   41
Table A3: Ordered Logit Religious Practice Regressions, Whole Sample, 1998  
 ATTENDANCE  PRAYER 
 Male  Female  Male  Female 
Carrot (absolutely believes in Heaven) 0.622 
(0.000) 
0.561 
(0.000) 
0.869 
(0.000) 
0.710 
(0.000) 
Stick (absolutely believes in Hell) 0.221 
(0.008) 
0.099 
(0.127) 
0.361 
(0.000) 
0.210 
(0.001) 
Childhood experience         
Father attended church services intensively 0.372 
(0.000) 
0.165 
(0.001) 
0.295 
(0.000) 
-0.064 
(0.185) 
Mother attended church services intensively 0.277 
(0.000) 
0.459 
(0.000) 
0.075 
(0.182) 
0.160 
(0.002) 
Respondent attended church intensively (at 12) 0.285 
(0.000) 
0.394 
(0.000) 
0.366 
(0.000) 
0.478 
(0.000) 
Self-reported religiosity 
Extremely religious
 
3.743 
(0.000) 
 
4.006 
(0.000) 
 
5.154 
(0.000) 
 
5.304 
(0.000) 
Very religious 3.703 
(0.000) 
3.736 
(0.000) 
5.162 
(0.000) 
4.908 
(0.000) 
Somewhat religious 2.809 
(0.000) 
2.875 
(0.000) 
4.035 
(0.000) 
3.990 
(0.000) 
Neither religious nor non-religious 1.831 
(0.000) 
1.940 
(0.000) 
2.768 
(0.000) 
2.728 
(0.000) 
Somewhat non-religious 1.334 
(0.000) 
1.381 
(0.000) 
2.107 
(0.000) 
1.964 
(0.000) 
Very non-religious 0.602 
(0.000) 
0.648 
(0.000) 
0.959 
(0.000) 
1.045 
(0.000) 
Extremely non-religious Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Marital variables        
Married 0.334 
(0.000) 
0.141 
(0.000) 
-0.059 
(0.196) 
-0.121 
(0.001) 
Married and spouse has no religion  -1.145 
(0.000) 
-0.773 
(0.000) 
-0.550 
(0.000) 
-0.400 
(0.000) 
Number of people in household 0.045 
(0.000) 
0.027 
(0.023) 
0.076 
(0.000) 
0.048 
(0.000) 
Age (years) 
60 and over 0.328 
(0.000) 
0.610 
(0.000) 
0.523 
(0.000) 
0.760 
(0.000) 
46-to-59 -0.021 
(0.725) 
0.290 
(0.000) 
0.179 
(0.003) 
0.409 
(0.000) 
31-to-45 -0.033 
(0.546) 
0.191 
(0.000) 
0.114 
(0.033) 
0.166 
(0.000) 
30 and under Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Education (last school attended) 
                                                            Academic  0.421 
(0.000) 
0.092 
(0.062) 
0.252 
(0.000) 
-0.121 
(0.011) 
High School 0.209 
(0.000) 
-0.021 
(0.659) 
0.148 
(0.005) 
-0.128 
(0.005)   42
Elementary school Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Country-specific characteristics        
Per-capita GDP (divided by 1000) 0.011 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.451) 
0.016 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.013) 
National average (attendance/prayer) 0.567 
(0.000) 
0.618 
(0.000) 
0.270 
(0.000) 
0.279 
(0.000) 
Sample size 11,022  12,979  11,651  13,503 
Pseudo-R
2 0.200 0.194  0.205  0.185 
Significance (p values) in parentheses   43
Table A4: Ordered Logit Religious Practice Regressions, European Countries, 1998  
 ATTENDANCE  PRAYER 
 Male  Female  Male  Female 
Carrot ( absolutely believes in Heaven) 0.805 
(0.000) 
0.608 
(0.000) 
0.915 
(0.000) 
0.744 
(0.000) 
Stick (absolutely believes in Hell) 0.200 
(0.040) 
0.241 
(0.002) 
0.288 
(0.012) 
0.179 
(0.011) 
Childhood experience         
Father attended church services intensively 0.550 
(0.000) 
0.454 
(0.000) 
0.230 
(0.000) 
-0.023 
(0.672) 
Mother attended church services intensively 0.150 
(0.024) 
0.319 
(0.000) 
0.121 
(0.066) 
0.162 
(0.005) 
Respondent attended church intensively (at 12) 0.311 
(0.000) 
0.275 
(0.000) 
0.546 
(0.000) 
0.538 
(0.000) 
Self-reported religiosity 
Extremely religious
 
3.622 
(0.000) 
 
4.025 
(0.000) 
 
5.648 
(0.000) 
 
5.474 
(0.000) 
Very religious 3.708 
(0.000) 
3.840 
(0.000) 
5.618 
(0.000) 
5.140 
(0.000) 
Somewhat religious 2.950 
(0.000) 
3.011 
(0.000) 
4.500 
(0.000) 
4.301 
(0.000) 
Neither religious nor non-religious 1.898 
(0.000) 
2.076 
(0.000) 
3.204 
(0.000) 
3.036 
(0.000) 
Somewhat non-religious 1.369 
(0.000) 
1.456 
(0.000) 
2.427 
(0.000) 
2.188 
(0.000) 
Very non-religious 0.686 
(0.000) 
0.798 
(0.000) 
1.298 
(0.000) 
1.266 
(0.000) 
Marital variables        
Married 0.312 
(0.000) 
0.149 
(0.000) 
-0.076 
(0.153) 
-0.107 
(0.009) 
Married and spouse has no religion  -1.371 
(0.000) 
-0.977 
(0.000) 
-0.928 
(0.000) 
-0.627 
(0.000) 
Number of people in household 0.043 
(0.006) 
0.039 
(0.005) 
0.036 
(0.019) 
0.033 
(0.016) 
Age (years) 
60 or over 0.271 
(0.000) 
0.611 
(0.000) 
0.471 
(0.000) 
0.708 
(0.000) 
46-to-59 -0.079 
(0.257) 
0.282 
(0.000) 
0.160 
(0.022) 
0.388 
(0.000) 
31-to45 -0.082 
(0.185) 
0.192 
(0.000) 
0.105 
(0.090) 
0.162 
(0.001) 
30 and under Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Education (last school attended) 
 Academic  0.397 
(0.000) 
0.127 
(0.018) 
0.238 
(0.000) 
-0.160 
(0.002) 
High School 0.238 
(0.000) 
0.025 
(0.627) 
0.138 
(0.018) 
-0.177 
(0.000)   44
Elementary school Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Country-specific characteristics        
Per-capita GDP (divided by 1000) 0.014 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.060) 
0.010 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.002) 
National average (attendance/prayer) 0.642 
(0.000) 
0.691 
(0.000) 
0.215 
(0.000) 
0.246 
(0.000) 
Sample size 8,741  10,608  9,268  11,081 
Pseudo-R
2 0.210 0.203  0.208  0.186 
Significance (p values) in parentheses   45
Table A5: Ordered Logit Regressions, European Catholic Countries, 1998  
 ATTENDANCE  PRAYER 
 Male  Female  Male  Female 
Carrot (absolutely believes in Heaven) 0.835 
(0.000) 
0.671 
(0.000) 
0.690 
(0.000) 
0.488 
(0.000) 
Stick (absolutely believes in Hell) 0.006 
(0.972) 
-0.015 
(0.910) 
0.201 
(0.172) 
0.163 
(0.141) 
Childhood experience         
Father attended church services intensively 0.664 
(0.000) 
0.440 
(0.000) 
0.354 
(0.002) 
0.027 
(0.788) 
Mother attended church services  intensively 0.245 
(0.058) 
0.499 
(0.000) 
0.247 
(0.052) 
0.179 
(0.108) 
Respondent attended church intensively (at 12) 0.549 
(0.000) 
0.543 
(0.000) 
0.804 
(0.000) 
0.647 
(0.000) 
Self-reported religiosity 
Extremely religious
 
4.089 
(0.000) 
 
4.643 
(0.000) 
 
4.497 
(0.000) 
 
4.654 
(0.000) 
Very religious 4.194 
(0.000) 
4.521 
(0.000) 
4.960 
(0.000) 
4.276 
(0.000) 
Somewhat religious 3.736 
(0.000) 
3.950 
(0.000) 
4.024 
(0.000) 
3.644 
(0.000) 
Neither religious nor non-religious 2.444 
(0.000) 
2.849 
(0.000) 
3.009 
(0.000) 
2.632 
(0.000) 
Somewhat non-religious 2.013 
(0.000) 
2.470 
(0.000) 
2.241 
(0.000) 
2.175 
(0.000) 
Very non-religious 1.410 
(0.002) 
1.445 
(0.004) 
0.325 
(0.406) 
0.371 
(0.346) 
Marital variables        
Married 0.237 
(0.040) 
0.060 
(0.503) 
-0.063 
(0.544) 
-0.063 
(0.430) 
Married and spouse has no religion  -1.779 
(0.001) 
-0.873 
(0.000) 
-1.017 
(0.011) 
-0.339 
(0.116) 
Number of people in household 0.074 
(0.017) 
0.022 
(0.413) 
0.044 
(0.114) 
0.027 
(0.268) 
Age (years) 
60 and over 1.045 
(0.000) 
1.093 
(0.000) 
0.960 
(0.000) 
1.057 
(0.000) 
46-to-59 0.350 
(0.022) 
0.555 
(0.000) 
0.492 
(0.000) 
0.635 
(0.000) 
31-to-45 0.219 
(0.106) 
0.445 
(0.000) 
0.382 
(0.003) 
0.192 
(0.068) 
30 and under Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Education (last school attended) 
 Academic  0.457 
(0.000) 
-0.019 
(0.845) 
0.412 
(0.000) 
-0.190 
(0.035) 
High School 0.365 
(0.002) 
0.114 
(0.282) 
0.172 
(0.101) 
-0.280 
(0.003)   46
Elementary Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Country-specific characteristics        
Per-capita GDP (divided by 1000) 0.028 
(0.001) 
0.012 
(0.112) 
-0.004 
(0.579) 
-0.055 
(0.000) 
National average (attendance/prayer) 0.873 
(0.000) 
0.740 
(0.000) 
0.321 
(0.000) 
0.181 
(0.000) 
Sample size 1,998  2,591  2,246  2,725 
Pseudo-R
2 0.194 0.169  0.178  0.122 
Significance (p values) in parentheses   47
Table A6: Ordered Logit Regressions, Whole Sample, 1998  
(Broader definitions of belief in heaven/hell) 
 ATTENDANCE  PRAYER 
 Male  Female  Male  Female 
Believes in Carrot (Heaven) 
(Definitely or probably)
0.424 
(0.000) 
0.402 
(0.000) 
0.987 
(0.000) 
0.717 
(0.000) 
Believes in Stick (Hell) 
(Definitely or probably)
0.268 
(0.000) 
0.185 
(0.000) 
0.248 
(0.000) 
0.288 
(0.000) 
Childhood experience         
Father attended church services intensively 0.394 
(0.000) 
0.182 
(0.000) 
0.302 
(0.000) 
-0.046 
(0.336) 
Mother attended church services intensively 0.259 
(0.000) 
0.468 
(0.000) 
0.042 
(0.461) 
0.164 
(0.002) 
Respondent attended church intensively (at 12) 0.281 
(0.000) 
0.378 
(0.000) 
0.362 
(0.000) 
0.459 
(0.000) 
Self-reported religiosity 
Extremely religious
 
3.763 
(0.000) 
 
3.992 
(0.000) 
 
5.033 
(0.000) 
 
5.180 
(0.000) 
Very religious 3.649 
(0.000) 
3.668 
(0.000) 
4.957 
(0.000) 
4.724 
(0.000) 
Somewhat religious 2.639 
(0.000) 
2.727 
(0.000) 
3.720 
(0.000) 
3.724 
(0.000) 
Neither religious nor non-religious 1.726 
(0.000) 
1.852 
(0.000) 
2.583 
(0.000) 
2.580 
(0.000) 
Somewhat non-religious 1.267 
(0.000) 
1.328 
(0.000) 
2.002 
(0.000) 
1.870 
(0.000) 
Very non-religious 0.582 
(0.000) 
0.627 
(0.000) 
0.907 
(0.000) 
0.999 
(0.000) 
Marital  variables         
Married 0.328 
(0.000) 
0.140 
(0.000) 
-0.063 
(0.171) 
-0.123 
(0.001) 
Married and spouse has no religion  -1.152 
(0.000) 
-0.758 
(0.000) 
-0.541 
(0.000) 
-0.364 
(0.000) 
Number of people in household 0.053 
(0.000) 
0.031 
(0.009) 
0.084 
(0.000) 
0.049 
(0.000) 
Age (in years) 
60 or above 0.358 
(0.000) 
0.633 
(0.000) 
0.581 
(0.000) 
0.809 
(0.000) 
46-to-59 0.009 
(0.874) 
0.322 
(0.000) 
0.240 
(0.000) 
0.472 
(0.000) 
31-to-45 -0.022 
(0.681) 
0.207 
(0.000) 
0.140 
(0.010) 
0.199 
(0.000) 
30 or under Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Education (last school attended) 
 Academic  0.414 
(0.000) 
0.097 
(0.049) 
0.251 
(0.000) 
-0.095 
(0.046)   48
High School 0.190 
(0.000) 
-0.024 
(0.617) 
0.115 
(0.029) 
-0.126 
(0.006) 
Elementary Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
Country-specific characteristics        
Per-capita GDP (divided by 1000) 0.011 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.385) 
0.015 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.033) 
National average (attendance/prayer) 0.556 
(0.000) 
0.625 
(0.000) 
0.255 
(0.000) 
0.279 
(0.000) 
Sample size 11,022  12,979  11,651  13,503 
Pseudo-R
2 0.198 0.193  0.208  0.186 
Significance (p values) in parentheses Electronic versions of the papers are available at 
http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/wp/working_papers.html 
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